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EQUIPMENT TO IV DRUG USERS
Maxwell J. MehhnanW
IN THE ABSENCE OF WIDESPREAD, publicly spon-
sored needle exchange programs, the proposal has been made
that physicians prescribe syringes and needles to intravenous
(IV) drug users in order to reduce the risk of infection from HIV
and other diseases that could result from needle sharing. One
question is whether physicians who engage in this behavior, as
well as pharmacists who fill the prescriptions, face a significant
threat of malpractice liability if the IV drug user or someone
else, perhaps an innocent bystander, is harmed as a result of the
prescribed equipment. No such cases have been reported, per-
haps because the practice is not yet frequent. For the reasons
explained in the analysis that follows, it is unlikely that any
malpractice suits would be brought successfully in the future.
In analyzing this issue, three assumptions are being made:
First, it is assumed that no state law is being violated by such a
prescribing practice, including state physician and pharmacist
licensing laws. (If this were not the case, the courts might deem
the behavior of health care professionals to be negligent per se.)
Second, it is assumed that the health care professional in all
other respects has acted in accordance with the applicable stan-
dard of care. In other words, the physician has properly exam-
ined the patient and taken a complete history, has obtained the
patient's informed consent when necessary, and has not made
an unreasonable mistake in terms of identifying the patient's IV
drug abuse and in terms of prescribing the appropriate injection
equipment. Similarly, the pharmacist has exercised due care in
filling the prescription. Based on these assumptions, the only
potential basis for liability is the fact that the physician has pre-
t The author is the Arthur E. Petersilge Professor of Law and Director of the
Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and Profes-
sor of Biomedical Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine.
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scribed the IV equipment or that the pharmacist has filled the
prescription. It is not being assumed that the person for whom
the equipment is prescribed is a patient of the physician's for
any purpose other than obtaining the prescription for the equip-
ment, although this certainly might be the case. (Arguably, a
physician who had a pre-existing relationship with the person
would be even less likely to be sued successfully than a physi-
cian who had never seen the person before the visit at which the
prescribing took place, since patients are less inclined to sue
physicians with whom they have ongoing relationships,' and
since the physician in such a relationship could more readily
establish that she was familiar with the patient's drug abuse and
potential for harm from sharing needles.)
Finally, this discussion assumes that the patient is mentally
competent and therefore can be reasonably expected to compre-
hend and follow instructions on the proper use and disposal of
the IV equipment. If this is not the case, and it may well not be
in the case of some IV drug users, the physician or pharmacist
must take special precautions, such as not providing access to
the equipment unless the patient is under the care of someone
who takes responsibility for the patient, as in a residential
treatment program.
One further point at the outset: The physician or pharmacist
who chooses not to provide access to TV equipment because of
fears of malpractice liability also must consider the possibility
of being liable if the drug user is harmed by that decision, such
as by becoming infected with HIV through needle sharing. In
other words, the potential liability for providing IV equipment
must be compared, not with the absence of liability altogether,
but with the risk of liability created by not providing access to
the IV equipment. (The only way to avoid any risk of liability
whatsoever might be to refrain from creating patient-physician
relationships with persons who might be IV drug users, which
may be difficult to accomplish for a number of reasons that are
beyond the scope of this paper, not the least of which is the
limited degree to which physicians in managed care plans can
1 See Berkeley Rice, Where Doctors Get Sued the Most, MED. ECON., Feb. 27,
1995, at 98, 100, 109 (discussing the breakdown of the doctor-patient relationship as
a result of increasing litigation); C. Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doc-
tors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609
(1994) (citing four factors, including poor communication and insensitivity by health
professionals, that contributed to the patient's decision to sue).
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refuse to take on specific patients from among the pool of en-
rollees.)
I. POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR PROVIDING
ACCESS TO IV EQUIPMENT
The best way to explain the potential malpractice risks
from providing access to IV equipment for patients who are
drug users is by discussing in turn each of the elements of a
malpractice suit, that is, the points that the patient would have
to prove in order to hold a physician or pharmacist liable.
A. Duty
A physician or pharmacist would only be liable as a profes-
sional to someone to whom he or she owed a professional duty
of care. As noted above, a physician might avoid such a duty by
refusing to enter into a patient-physician relationship with
someone who was a drug user. Assuming, however, that the
physician had agreed to provide professional services to the
drug user, the physician would owe that person a professional
duty of care.
B. Injury
In order to hold someone liable for malpractice, the plain-
tiff must demonstrate that he or she has been injured. In the case
of a physician or pharmacist who provided access to IV equip-
ment to a drug user, several possible injuries are foreseeable:
The plaintiff might allege that, as a result of being given ac-
cess to the IV equipment, he or she had continued to abuse IV
drugs and, as a result, had been harmed by the effects of the
drugs (such as by becoming addicted). (Implicit in this allega-
tion is the questionable causal proposition that, if the person had
not been given access to the equipment by the defendant, he or
she would not have continued to use the drugs.)
The plaintiff (or a family member) might allege that, as a
result of being given access to the IV equipment, the drug user
overdosed and was killed or injured. (Implicit in this allegation
is the questionable causal proposition that, if the person had not
been given access to the equipment, he or she would not have
overdosed.)
The plaintiff might allege that he or she had been harmed
(such as by becoming infected, continuing to abuse IV drugs, or
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overdosing) as a result of using the IV equipment that had been
prescribed, although it had not been prescribed for the plaintiff.
For example, the plaintiff could have obtained the equipment
from the person for whom it had been prescribed. (Again, the
plaintiff implicitly would be maintaining that the harm would
not have occurred had the IV equipment not been prescribed.)
Finally, the plaintiff could be a non-IV drug user who al-
leges injury as the result of coming into contact with the equip-
ment, such as becoming infected following a needle stick. Such
a plaintiff might be a law enforcement officer, a garbage col-
lector, a health care worker, or an innocent "bystander" like a
curious child who finds the paraphernalia lying in the street.
Even if the plaintiff had not actually become infected, he or she
might seek damages for the fear of becoming infected as a result
of the exposure to the risk.
Even though these injuries arguably are foreseeable, a
plaintiff would have a difficult time prevailing on the injury is-
sue. For one thing, he or she would have to persuade the judge
or jury not only that he or she had been injured, but that the in-
jury resulted from the IV equipment that had been prescribed,
rather than from other IV equipment. This may be extremely
difficult to prove, since the prescribed equipment is not likely to
bear any physical marks that would distinguish it from other IV
equipment that was obtained illegally.
In addition, the plaintiff would have to show that the injury
sustained was not outweighed by any benefits accruing to him
or her as a result of the IV equipment having been prescribed.
This is the legal doctrine of "offset." 2 The defendant could ar-
gue that, even though the plaintiff had been injured, the injury
was offset by the benefit of the reduction in the risk of infection
achieved by prescribing the IV equipment. (Even if the court
felt that the risks of the injury that occurred were not out-
weighed completely by the reduction in the risk of infection, the
magnitude of the harm that occurred, and hence the damages to
be awarded, would be reduced by the value of the benefit that
was conferred.3)
2 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) 01 TORTS § 920 (1979) 0imiting damages
when a benefit is conferred upon the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's tortious
conduct).
3 See id. §§ 291, 293 (addressing how an unreasonable risk and the magni-
tude of risk, respectively, are determined).
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Finally, most courts refuse to permit damages to be
awarded merely for being afraid of becoming infected, unless
the individual actually was exposed to an infectious agent, such
as HIV.4
C. "But-For" Causation
As mentioned in the previous section, the plaintiff not only
would have to prove injury as the result of the defendant's ac-
tions, but that the injury would not have happened if the defen-
dant had not acted. In other words, the plaintiff would have to
prove that he or she would have given up or materially reduced
IV drug abuse but-for the prescribed equipment, that he or she
would not have overdosed, that he or she would not have ob-
tained IV equipment from some other source, or that he or she
would not have been stuck by another contaminated sharp in-
strument. The element of "but-for" causation is likely to be ex-
tremely difficult for the plaintiff to establish. For example, it is
likely to be hard to find credible expert witnesses who would
testify that someone more probably than not would have
stopped using drugs if IV equipment had not been prescribed, or
that an addict would not have found equipment from some other
source with which to take an overdose or to become infected.
A more plausible argument regarding but-for causation
might be made by someone who was injured by a needle stick,
and who could identify the IV drug user, and through their tes-
timony, also identify the physician or pharmacist who provided
access to the IV drug equipment. This might be the case, for
example, when a law enforcement officer is stuck by a sharp or
needle in the course of making an arrest. One way for the physi-
cian or pharmacist to reduce the risk of liability in these situa-
tions is to instruct the IV drug user about proper handling and
disposal of the IV equipment. (Arguably, this is required as part
of the physician's and the pharmacist's ordinary duty of care,
although there are no reported cases in which a health care pro-
4 See Jeffrey B. Greenstein, Note, New Jersey's Continuing Expansion of Tort
Liabilit: Williamson v. Waldman and the Fear of AIDS Cause of Action, 30
RUrGMRS L. J. 489, 492-493 (1999). For a discussion of this and other restrictions on
claims for "mere exposure to risk," see Scott Buris, Human Imnmunodeficiency Virus
- Infected Health Care Workers: The Restoration of Professional Authorit, 5 ARCH.
FAM. MED. 102 (1996).
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fessional has been held liable for failing to provide such infor-
mation, as a result of which someone was injured.5)
D. Negligence
Even if the plaintiff can prove that the prescribed equip-
ment was the but-for cause of the net injury, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant was negligent, that is, failed to meet the
applicable standard of care. Physicians and pharmacists are held
to a professional standard of care. They are generally expected
to act the way a reasonable physician or pharmacist would act in
the same circumstances. With a few exceptions not relevant
here, judges and juries determine on the basis of the testimony
of expert witnesses what behavior meets this standard of care,
and whether or not the defendant acted in that manner.
In order to prevail on the issue of negligence, the plaintiff,
via expert testimony from physicians or pharmacists, would
have to convince the court that a reasonable health care profes-
sional would not have prescribed IV equipment in this case. The
defendant presumably would introduce expert testimony to the
contrary. The judge would apply various legal tests to help de-
termine whether the defendant had behaved reasonably.
One test, reflecting the fact that no behavior is completely
free of risk, is basically a comparison of risks and benefits.6 The
defendant would argue that, while prescribing IV equipment
perhaps entailed some risk of harm to the patient, the risk of
harm was outweighed by the expected benefit in reducing the
risk of infection. (Note that this test is similar to, but not the
same as, the offset calculation mentioned in the earlier discus-
sion of injury. There, the issue, resolved on the basis of hind-
sight, is how much actual benefit and harm the plaintiff re-
ceived as a result of the defendant's action. The risk/benefit test
for negligence instead asks how much benefit and harm a rea-
5 The closest cases involve efforts to hold needle manufacturers liable for
sticks, in part because of the failure to warn health care workers of the risk of infec-
tion. See, e.g., Hamley v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 886 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1989)
(medical assistant contracted hepatitis B virus) and Riley v. Becton Dickinson Vas-
cular Access, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 879 (1995) (nurse contracted FIV infection). In
Hamley, the court held that the danger of a stick was "open and obvious" and thus no
warning was required; however, a warning might be required for the specific risk of
contracting hepatitis B. In Riley, the plaintiff admitted that she was aware of the dan-
ger of infection. Neither case resulted in liability for the needle manufacturer.
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 291.
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sonable person in the defendant's position should have antici-
pated when he or she decided to act. A defendant who actually
caused net harm to the plaintiff would not be negligent if the
benefits reasonably (although ultimately incorrectly) appeared
to outweigh the risks.)
Even if the plaintiff's experts persuasively testified that
most physicians or pharmacists would not regard providing ac-
cess to IV equipment to be reasonable, the defendant would still
not be negligent if the defendant's experts convinced the court
that something akin to a "respectable minority" of physicians or
pharmacists would have so acted.7 In other words, the law rec-
ognizes that health care professionals must be allowed, within
certain limits, to deviate from the mainstream approach.
One problem that might arise, particularly at the very in-
ception of the practice by physicians and pharmacists of pro-
viding access to IV drug equipment, would be that expert wit-
nesses for the defense, although testifying that providing access
was reasonable, might admit that no one (except the defendant)
actually did it. In determining whether the defendant's behavior
conformed to the standard of care, the court would face the
disjuncture between how practitioners ought to behave and how
they actually behave. In theory, courts should recognize, and
instruct juries, that the former is the correct test. (In one cele-
brated case, a court in effect ruled that the entire profession of
ophthalmology was negligent because no one routinely con-
ducted a glaucoma test that plaintiff's experts testified was rea-
sonable.8) But there is always a slight risk that the first practi-
tioner to adopt a new approach will be found liable for not fol-
lowing the customary practice of his or her profession. (One
way possibly to reduce this risk is to inform the patient and get
his or her consent to the fact that, by providing access to IV
drug equipment, the practitioner, in the patient's interest, is de-
parting from customary practice. This would make the act of
providing the equipment akin to an experiment, with the practi-
tioner obtaining the patient's informed consent to participate.)
Finally, even if the plaintiff established that providing ac-
cess to IV equipment would be unreasonable in some or even
7 See 1 BARRY R. FuRRow E'T A.., HEALTH LAW § 6-5(a), at 382-83 (1995)
(explaining that the "respectable minority" defense permits a physician to adopt a
mode of treatment that reasonable and prudent medical professionals would adopt
under similar circumstances to avoid liability for harm caused to patients).
" See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
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most cases, the defendant could still try to prove that doing so
was reasonable in this specific case. For example, the defendant
could argue that, while providing access ordinarily might not be
reasonable, he or she had taken special care to determine that
providing access would be in this patient's best interest and
would not be a threat to others. Thus, the defendant could point
to the measures taken to educate the patient about proper dis-
posal. Or, in some cases involving an overdose using the pre-
scribed equipment, the defendant might demonstrate that this
particular patient was at such an extreme risk of harm from us-
ing infected needles that deviating from ordinary practice in the
patient's case was justified.
E. Proximate Cause
"Proximate cause" is a confusing doctrine that comes into
play when the injury caused by the defendant's negligent be-
havior is bizarre, highly attenuated, or out of all proportion to
what normally would be expected to happen. In these unusual
cases, proximate cause permits the defendant to avoid liability
on the basis that imposing liability would be unjust. (An exam-
ple would be a case in which a person negligently tossed a ciga-
rette starting a fire that, when it burned down a theater, caused a
dilapidated section of downtown stores finally to go out of
business. A suit brought by the owner of one of the stores
against the person who threw the cigarette most likely would
fail for lack of "proximate cause," even though the defendant
was clearly shown to have been the negligent "but-for" cause of
the store going out of business.) If the injury caused by provid-
ing access to IV equipment was unusual enough, the defendant
could avoid liability even though he or she was shown to be
negligent. On the other hand, if the plaintiff can show that the
occurrence of the injury was not so far-fetched, such as when an
IV drug user overdoses or someone is stuck inadvertently, the
physician or pharmacist will have to rely on grounds other than
proximate cause, such as asserting that there was no negligence
on their part, to avoid being liable.
Another type of situation in which the doctrine of proxi-
mate cause negates liability is when the defendant's actions
have been succeeded by intentional wrongful actions of others
[Vol. 11:73
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leading to the plaintiff's injury.9 Thus, a physician or pharma-
cist who had provided access to IV equipment to person A
would not be liable to person B who was injured as a result of
being given the equipment for IV drug use by A with A's intent,
knowledge, or substantial certainty that injury to B (such as
continued use, addiction, or overdosing) would occur.
F. Affirmative Defenses
Even if a physician or pharmacist is deemed to have negli-
gently caused injury by providing access to IV equipment, he or
she will not be liable if the plaintiff is found to have assumed
the risk of the injury.10 Assumption of risk requires that the vic-
tim be aware of the risk and knowingly and voluntarily agree to
accept it. A physician or pharmacist who provided access to IV
equipment and who educated the patient about the risks of IV
drug use might argue successfully that the patient had been
made aware of the risks and had assumed them. The physician
or pharmacist even might require the patient to sign a written
statement agreeing to refrain from suit if injury should occur,
although it is not certain that courts would uphold such a waiver
against the patient. Similarly, in the case of injury to a drug user
other than the person for whom the equipment was prescribed,
the defendant might assert that anyone who uses someone else's
equipment thereby accepts the risk of being injured.
The assumption of risk defense (called an "affirmative" de-
fense because, unless it is raised by the defendant, the failure of
the plaintiff to address it does not prevent the plaintiff from re-
covering) has its limitations, however. Courts sometimes are
reluctant to shield a person from liability for injuries resulting
from negligence even though his or her victim had been warned
about the risks ahead of time. Moreover, as noted at the outset
of this paper, the physician or pharmacist must be reasonably
confident that the IV drug user is competent.
Another affirmative defense is the plaintiffs own negli-
gence. Thus, even if plaintiffs are not deemed to have assumed
the risk, they may still be found to have been negligent by be-
9 See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 448 (addressing
causal relationship between intentional subsequent wrongdoer and defendant's liabil-
ity). 10 See id. § 496C (stating that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover when he
voluntarily acts with knowledge of the potential risk of harm).
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coming drug users in the first place, by taking an overdose, by
accepting IV equipment from someone else, or by handling
sharps carelessly. In a few states, this affirmative defense,
known as "contributory negligence," is a total bar to recovering
damages. Most jurisdictions, however, adopt a "comparative
negligence" approach, according to which the plaintiff can still
recover some damages, but the amount is reduced in proportion
to the plaintiff's degree of fault. (In some states, the plaintiff
can only recover if he or she is found to be less at fault, or no
more at fault, than the defendant.)
Given the degree to which IV drug users are likely to be
active participants in the activity which leads to their injury, the
affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and contributory or
comparative negligence are especially important reasons why
their suits against physicians or pharmacists who provide access
to IV equipment are unlikely to be very successful. The same
defenses may provide protection for physicians and pharmacists
when the IV equipment they provide causes a needle stick to a
health care worker or law enforcement officer, who arguably
should be aware of the risk, and who should take proper pre-
cautions to prevent harm to themselves. Only if injury occurs to
a truly "innocent bystander," such as a child in an area like a
playground, would the defenses of assumption of risk and the
victim's own negligence be of no avail.
G. Summary
It is hardly ever possible (and, for a lawyer, rarely advis-
able) to provide an ironclad assurance against the possibility
that a judge or jury somewhere, on some set of facts, will find
someone liable for a given act. Nevertheless, the risk of liability
for physicians or pharmacists who provide access to IV equip-
ment to drug users seems remote. The victim may not be able to
establish that the defendant acted negligently. Even if the plain-
tiff prevails on the issue of negligence, it will be extremely dif-
ficult in most cases to prove that net harm has occurred, or that
the net harm was in fact caused by the action of the defendant.
Finally, any recovery would be reduced, if not barred alto-
gether, by the victim's own negligence.
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H. POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR FAILING TO
PROVIDE ACCESS TO IV EQUIPMENT
As noted at the outset, health care professionals rarely, if
ever, confront a choice between a course of action that presents
some risk of liability and another that presents no risk at all.
Instead, they face a choice between alternative courses of action
where each carries some risk of being sued. The professional's
goal, therefore, must be to identify the alternative that presents
the least, or the most acceptable form of risk.
In deciding whether or not to provide access to IV drug
equipment to their patients, the choice is not between the risk of
suit from providing access versus no risk, but between the risk
of suit from providing access and the risk of suit from not pro-
viding access. A decision not to provide access to IV equipment
also might cause injury in the form of infection or injuries sus-
tained from obtaining and using equipment illegally.
As in the case of suits complaining of injuries sustained
from prescribed equipment, plaintiffs in suits arising from a
failure to prescribe would encounter difficulties in attempting to
prove but-for causation and injury since they would have to
demonstrate that they would have avoided harm if the equip-
ment had been prescribed. This might be hard to prove if the
evidence showed, for example, that IV drug users continue to
share IV equipment with other users even if their own equip-
ment is provided by a physician or pharmacist. Even if a plain-
tiff could establish the elements of injury and causation, a judge
or jury might decline to regard a refusal to provide access as
negligent.
On the other hand, published reports of the success of nee-
dle exchange programs in reducing the risk of infection11 might
persuade courts that plaintiffs were entitled at least to a pre-
sumption of causation when physicians or pharmacists declined
1 See, e.g., Thomas J. Coates et al., HIV Prevention in Developed Countries,
348 LANcET 1143 (1996) (finding that cities with low HIV prevalence among inject-
ing drug users made clean syringes available); Don C. Des Jarlais et al., Continuity
and Change Within an HIV Epidemic: Injecting Drug Users in New York City, 1984
Through 1992, 271 JAMA 121 (1994) (indicating that underground syringe ex-
change was associated with a significant decline in AIDS risk behaviors) ; Peter Lu-
rie & Ernest Drucker, An Opportunity Lost: HIV Infections Associated with Lack of a
National Needle-Exchange Programme in the USA, 349 LANcET 604 (1997) (report-
ing that the lack of a national needle exchange program may have contributed to pre-
ventable HIV infection).
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to provide them with access to "clean" equipment. As more
physicians and pharmacists begin to provide access, the chances
increase that those who fail or refuse to do so will be found
negligent.
In short, the physician or pharmacist contemplating
whether or not to provide access to IV equipment must choose
between two (or more) risky courses of action. If reasonable
steps are taken to minimize the risks posed by prescribed IV
equipment, a good case can be made that refusing to provide
access creates at least as much, if not more, risk of liability than
providing access to the IV equipment.
